It is important to note that there are differences in the affordability of cigarettes in SSA and this preliminary analysis cannot fully explain this variation. It is possible that some of these broader trends in accessibility are due to economic liberalization, but this relationship requires further research to identify the exact determinants. In addition to economic liberalization, the level of excise duties on tobacco products resulting from the implementation of the FCTC will affect affordability by increasing the retail price of cigarettes. As already stated, it is not only price growth, but also revenue growth that drives accessibility and parts of SSA experienced sustained and relatively high growth during the IP. Although very unequal, the SA has reduced its Gini index (measure of income inequality) by almost 5 points on average since 1990 [72], which represents a little more purchasing power for a large part of the population. In the broader logic that economic liberalization leads to economic growth, some of these effects on affordability may occur through this more indirect mechanism — that is, reaping some broader economic benefits from general liberalization — not just through liberalization, particularly for the tobacco sector. Another criticism is the alleged preference of large tobacco groups over small independent tobacco producers and sellers. Proponents of this argument argue that some price restrictions make it harder for small producers to compete with big tobacco. Twelve states have successfully fought this argument in court over the past two years, and the application of the MSA will continue forever throughout the United States. [Citation required] The authors thank John Bloom, Thomas Novotny, Robert Weissman and Judith Wilkenfeld for their information and analysis of U.S. tobacco policy; Alicia Yamin for contributions to human rights and health; and the editors of this supplement on Tobacco Control for their thoughtful review of previous designs. At the time of the entry into force of the Master Settlement Agreement, the OPMs together controlled about 97% of the domestic cigarette market.

In addition to these «Initial Settlement Parties» (OSPS), the Master Settlement Agreement allows other tobacco companies to join the comparison; A list of these «parties that settle a posteriori» (SSPs) is maintained by the National Association of Attorneys General. [16] Since 1998, approximately 41 other tobacco companies have joined the Master Settlement Agreement. These companies, referred to as the Future Participating Producers (SPH), are subject to the restrictions of the Master Settlement Agreement and must make payments to the Member States of settlement, in accordance with the Master Settlement Agreement. Together, MPOs and PMS are designated as Participating Producers (SMPs). Any tobacco company that decides not to participate in the Master Settlement Agreement is designated as a non-participating manufacturer (NPM). Before liberalization, most African governments owned exclusively the companies. In the era of economic liberalization, countries have opened their economies to the private sector. In some cases, this has given transnational tobacco companies (ICTs) the opportunity to purchase state-owned tobacco companies, including leaf processing and cigarette manufacturing. In 1995, RJ Reynolds, for example, bought the national Tanzania Cigarette Company (although Japan Tobacco International later acquired a 75% stake in the company) [49].

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